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Abstrak 
Pada kurun waktu beberapa abad, orang China 
meninggalkan kampung halamannya dalam jumlah besar 
didorong oleh sebab dan niat yang berbeda-beda. Mereka 
yang berlayar ke selatan mendarat di kepulauan yang 
kemudian menjadi bagian dari Republik Indonesia. Ada juga 
yang tiba di benua selatan yang sekarang dikenal sebagai 
negara Federasi Australia. Meski beragam, gambaran 
mental mengenai etnis Cina sangat dibatasi oleh stereotip 
yang sempit. Di Indonesia, etnis Cina digambarkan sebagai 
orang-orang yang tanpa ampun mengejar laba, seringkali 
dengan mengorbankan orang-orang di sekitar mereka, 
dan enggan membantu kesejahteraan masyarakat 
tempat tinggal mereka. Di Australia, gambaran etnis Cina 
yang ada di tengah masyarakat luas berkaitan dengan 
adaptasi, kebiasaan, dan filsafat kehidupan, yang berbeda 
dari kebanyakan penduduk yang berlatar belakang etnis 
dan budaya Anglo-Celtic dan Eropa. Tulisan ini berusaha 
mengangkat ke permukaan dan menganalisis titik-titik 
gelap dari topik ini, yaitu aspek-aspek tentang diri mereka 
yang luput dari pandangan-diri etnis Tionghoa, sekaligus 
aspek-aspek yang lolos dari radar masyarakat luas yang 
non-Cina. 
Indonesia: How many Chinese?
The number of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia has been debated for a long time. 
Leo Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta (2003:73) speculate the number to be 
around 1.45 to 2.04 percent. Suryadinata et al (2003:76) explain the need for 
inference and speculation in coming to the figures. 
It is not easy to estimate the number and percentage of ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia. Discussions on the quantitative aspects of the Chinese relied 
mostly on information from the 1930 Population Census (Suryadinata, 
Arifin and Ananta 2003:76).
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Suryadinata continue that while the 2000 Population Census distinguishes 
between the ethnic Chinese with Indonesian citizenship and those with foreign 
citizenship, it still does not provide a full and complete picture in terms of the 
number of ethnic Chinese (with Indonesian citizenships).  Only 11 provinces, 
covering 68.45 percent of the total Indonesian population, contain the figures. 
The rest of the ethnic Chinese is not one of the eight largest ethnic groups in 
those provinces. 
In any case, if the figures representing such a small segment of the 
population seem disproportionate to the definite profile in the country’s 
social and political landscape, a brief investigation into what creates the 
profile has revealed colourful and complex accounts involving many parties. 
Interestingly, the profile has been largely created by the popular belief that 
the ethnic Chinese have dominated Indonesia’s economy, complemented by 
the accompanying stereotype which prevails and persists until today.
They are mostly depicted as business operators, (whatever size business 
they operate), who are ruthless seekers of financial profit and often with 
complete disregard for, even at the detriment of, the majority of people around 
them. On top of that, among the mainstream population they are perceived 
as ‘rootless’, hence having no loyalty to the country in which they live, in 
this case Indonesia. Related to that, it is also widely believed that they are 
still loyal to their motherland, China. This perceived loyalty is often seen as 
the reason for their exclusivity and it is reflected in their preponderance to 
socialize among themselves also their avoidance of interracial marriages 
Like most stereotypes, that of ethnic Chinese does contain some truth, 
albeit not the whole truth. Having been reduced into the scale of a caricature, 
the stereotype does not reveal the complexities of causes and consequences 
behind it.If we isolate two major elements of the stereotype, and analyse them 
even briefly, we may find some interesting overlap of myth and fact.
They Are All in Business
During Soeharto’s New Order government (1966 – 1998), increasing numbers 
of ethnic Chinese turned to private enterprise of varying sizes, not only 
because many indeed fit naturally into this field, but also because they were 
shut out of most other avenues1.  If the situation had been allowed to develop 
naturally,  many more ethnic Chinese would most likely have entered other
1 To deprive ethnic Chinese of their social, cultural and economic space there were laws and               
regulations as well as widespread practices on the part of the authorities which had no legal 
base yet accepted as a given. Among the latter was the ‘unofficial quota’ imposed on ethnic 
Chinese entering civil service, military service, employment in state-owned enterprise 
and academia. These restrictions also applied to ethnic Chinese entering state universities, 
pushing them into a situation where only those who, or whose parents, were able to afford 
private university fees, were able to continue to tertiary education. 
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professions such as lecturers, politicians, public services domain, or artists, 
where a small number have indeed found their vocations. 
Ethnic Chinese have not been hard-wired to only operate businesses. 
This assumption is certainly not historically based.  The Chinese who came at 
different times to what is now Indonesia had widely different vocations. Lynn 
Pan (1990:6) recounts the circumstances, social and political, which brought 
private merchants/traders, hunters, artisans and farmers from the southern 
provinces to flee south. Based on available documentation of the later years 
on the occupations of the ethnic Chinese, it might be inferred that those who 
came and settled in the archipelago before then were of the same vocations 
and occupations. As the varied vocations of the immigrants indicate, they 
were not all merchants and traders, and naturally they did not all go into 
business
Chinese, asserts Wang Gung-wu (1994:22), had been sailing to Southeast 
Asia since the time of Song Dynasty, though written records about Chinese 
migration would only become available from the beginning of Ming Dynasty. 
Wang (1994:4-20) sees that the migration follows four patterns:  the trader 
pattern, the coolie pattern, the sojourner pattern, and the descent and re-
migrant pattern. The first three being the most relevant to the situation in 
Indonesia. I will borrow Wang’s categorisation in my review and analyses of 
the occupations of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.  
The trader pattern, which was the dominant pattern by the 18th century, 
refers to traders, miners and other skilled workers who left China for various 
reasons. They sailed in different directions; they arrived in various lands, 
including in Southeast Asia, where some of their numbers then decided to 
stay. For the purpose of this article, I will focus specifically on the areas of the 
archipelago in the region which is today’s Indonesia. 
The coolie pattern refers to mostly men of peasant origins, landless 
labourers and urban poor who went in large numbers to, among other places, 
such as North America and Australia. During the gold rushes, they looked 
for gold as well as work in plantations, railway construction sites, and other 
openings where manual labour was needed. It occurred in Southeast Asia 
also, though in a much smaller scale. In terms of the archipelago, the most 
significant segment of this pattern is the Batavia chapter.  Even prior to the 
existence of Batavia, according to Susan Blackburn, writing then as Susan 
Abeyasekere (1987:6), Chinese had been living in the place, then known as 
Jayakarta. Dutch accounts described Jayakarta, as 
‘…a provisioning port where ships could anchor in an excellent harbour 
and find good drinking water, local timber for repairs, and arak (rice wine) 
produced by the Chinese who had settled there. (Abeyasakere 1987:6) 
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The documents were obviously referring to the time prior to 1619, the 
year Jayakarta was demolished by the Dutch. The Chinese then, were already 
set up in small businesses, and were known as eager and serious workers. 
When Jan Pieterszoon Coen of the Dutch East India Company (known as VOC) 
eventually began to build Batavia, he saw that to really create a European 
society in the town he needed more workers, the best and easiest to get, he 
observed, being the Chinese.
So keen was he to build up their numbers quickly in Batavia that in 1622 
he sent ships to China to kidnap people on the coast. Once the port became 
established… Chinese traders came of their own accord, bringing poor coolies 
from the south of China. (Abeyasakere 1987:23)  
The sojourners pattern is very different from the previously mentioned 
ones. In the beginning of 19th century, this pattern has ideological and 
political undercurrents. The sojourners were teachers, journalists and other 
professionals who came to Southeast Asia, including the archipelago a large 
part of which had then become the Dutch East Indies. Most of the sojourners, 
according to Wang (1994:6-7) were keen to promote a greater awareness of 
Chinese culture and the socio-political development in the country. A much 
smaller number of this class of people were known to have sailed on to 
Australia and New Zealand. 
The peasants, landless labourers and urban poor were driven out of 
China by immediate forces created by the political situations of that time which 
generated more widespread poverty among those who were already poor. 
Wherever they landed their first priority would be to build a better life. In the 
case of those who settled in the archipelago, many inevitably were unable to 
find what they were seeking. They remained poor and landless, in the Dutch 
East Indies in particular. Colonial policies then making it difficult for Chinese 
to acquire land. The more fortunate however, would have moved on to better 
positions in life, such as various small businesses. Those who were able to 
find local indigenous or other Chinese women and build better lives, would 
encourage their descendants to move further up the social rungs. Nowadays, 
the only region with a significant ethnic Chinese farmer population was West 
Kalimantan. Most in the other areas do not live off the land.
Rootless: Loyalty to China Rather Than Indonesia
It is not useful to confuse the meaning of ‘rootless’ with the notion of 
‘maintaining links with ancestral land’. Many Indonesians from north Sumatra 
who now live in Jakarta for instance, feel they have roots where they live. Yet, 
they still maintain their links with the homes of their ancestors. The desire not 
to sever the links with China is multi-faceted, however. This sentiment has 
largely evolved and dove-tailed with the political developments in Indonesia, 
the Southeast Asian region, and China itself. 
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1. It Is Primordially Driven
Pan (1990:11) brings to attention a belief more psychological than factual, held 
by many in the Chinese diaspora that they were the proud descendants of 
Huang Di, the Yellow Emperor, the mythical ancestor of the Han Dynasty. 
Irrational though it may be, it has been well documented that when a 
particular people physically leave their land of origins to settle somewhere 
else, they develop  strong needs to feel connected to it, regardless of how deep 
they have grown roots in the place they live. Those who never leave China 
may not have the same intense self-identification as the desire to be connected 
felt by their counterparts who left. In fact, in most cases, the ancestral cultures 
to which these people believe they have links, often no longer exist, as the 
original cultures in their natural sites continually evolve.
2. It Is Reinforced by Social and Cultural Ambience, Legal and Political 
Environments, and Politically Induced Insecurity
The earliest arrivals, assuming those who left especially during the times of 
Ming Dynasty or maybe earlier, had left their extended families, their comfort 
zones, behind. Depending on the reception they received in their destinations, 
they would have physically and mentally settled in the new lands, or moved 
on in search of new places. Even if they had been well received and able 
to fit into the local community life with relatively few problems, it would 
be fair to expect that they would have wanted to maintain links with their 
loved ones in the homeland. Over decades their descendants, especially those 
born of indigenous mothers, would have assimilated into the indigenous 
communities where they lived, naturally and without force on both parts. 
Though there are certainly ethnic Chinese who stand out in terms of social 
vernacular such as appearance and body language, despite speaking local 
languages, many of the descendants of the original emigrants are now almost 
indistinguishable from their indigenous neighbours. Though in many cases 
some aspects of Chinese culture have been incorporated into their lives. In 
Jakarta area, for instance, they live in Kemayoran, Tanjung Priok, Palmerah, 
and on the outskirts such as Tangerang, Serang and Muara Karang, as well 
as other more central, suburbs.  They are spread across the socio-economic 
continuum from very poor to reasonably comfortable. Only a very small 
number became outstandingly rich.
Ethnic Chinese During The Dutch Occupation
During three and a half centuries of Dutch occupation ending officially 
on 17 August 1945, the Chinese were continuously used by the colonial 
administration as middlemen, given licenses to be tax-collectors and harbour 
masters, for example. They were thus made distinguishable from the 
indigenous population as well as other non-indigenous non-European races. 
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This arrangement may well have served both the Dutch and the Chinese as 
well. The Dutch were not having to dirty their hands while still collecting the 
dues and the Chinese, who were known to very rarely recoil from hard work, 
benefitting financially while enjoying the power lent to them by the Dutch. 
The Chinese, especially those who enjoyed significant economic success, thus 
perceived themselves as closer to the power elite, in this case the Dutch, than 
other ethnic groups or the indigenous majority. Many of the wealthy would 
have behaved in a superior manner vis-à-vis the indigenous majority. If the 
indigenous population, especially those in the lower end of the social rungs, 
harboured any resentment toward their Dutch masters. It was necessarily 
tinged with awe, due to the power the Dutch never hesitated to exercise. 
In the  meantime, the resentment the populus felt toward the Chinese, 
while clouded with fear for their apparent closeness to power, was largely 
laced with contempt. While the wealthy Chinese were able to afford guards 
for their safety, it was the poorer ones among them who became vulnerable 
to attacks or robberies by some indigenous people who regarded themselves 
as being the oppressed in an unfair social arrangement. While the wealthy felt 
bolstered by a sense of proximity to power (most likely false, nonetheless), the 
poorer Chinese resorted to the ‘links’ with China, their ancestral land, which 
in reality did not do them much good, either.
Legally, the Dutch did not make it easier for the Chinese to find their 
spot vis-à-vis the rest of the population. The Constitutional Regulation of 
1854 placed the Chinese under the same legal footing as the natives. The 
Regulation separated the population into two legal classes: Europeans and 
those equated with Europeans, and the natives and those equated with them. 
Equated with Europeans were the indigenous Christians, and equated with 
the natives were Chinese, along with Arab, Japanese and other nonEuropean 
races – these would later be called ‘foreign orientals’ -.
As Charles Coppel (2002:158-159) asserts, the concept of ‘equating’ is 
very complicated.  The Regulation conferred power to the Government to 
make exceptions to the classification referred above. While equated with the 
natives, various pieces of legislation blurred the issue. Coppel names as an 
example the ‘Agrarian Law of 1870 which prohibited the sale or permanent 
transfer of land from ‘natives’ to Europeans or other ‘foreigners’ like the 
Chinese’ (Coppel 2002:59). Moreover, Coppel points out, 
The Chinese were also required to reside in designated districts (wijken) 
and were not permitted to travel from one part of the colony to another 
unless they obtained a government pass (Coppel 2002:59)  
This certainly did not make natural social mixing with the rest of the 
population any easier for the Chinese. Mixing however did occur, but limited, 
mainly to the marketplace.
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Another issue which may have been seen as Chinese stand-offishness 
is the lobbying by a number of Chinese during the end of the 19th century 
which continued throughout the first decades of the 20th century. The 
colonial government ‘equate’ all Chinese in the Indies with Europeans. This 
followed a significant move in 1890 to ‘equate’ with Europeans, all Japanese 
nationals and ethnic Chinese whose land of origins was Formosa (as Taiwan 
was known then). This move was a result of the Netherlands government’s 
treaty with Japan. Given a choice, the Chinese would have preferred being 
included in the group ‘equated’ with Europeans, not only because that would 
redress the anomaly in relation to the Japanese and Taiwanese, but also being 
‘equated’ with Europeans would mean being able to enjoy the protection of 
the European criminal code with respect to arbitrary arrest, jail condition, and 
legally qualified tribunal. In the native court only the presiding chairman was 
legally qualified.  It was a hopeless situation for the Chinese, but as it had 
happened and would happen again, most just accepted the situation, but the 
politically aware among them began to look toward China where nationalist 
fervour was swelling, in the hope that a stronger China would be able to sway 
the Netherlands government.
The majority of Chinese who had enjoyed Dutch education and those 
who were politically realistic took the option of going with the flow, because 
they knew that for China to come to their aid was not a reasonable likelihood. 
However it does not mean they liked the situation. Spread in the middle of 
the continuum were a fair number who were in different professions such as 
writers, lawyers, teachers and various artists, who had accepted the Indies 
as their spiritual as well as actual home, and had been imbued with similar 
feeling of nationalism as their indigenous counterparts.
The early 1940s was a significant turn of attitudes among the Chinese. 
The Japanese landed in 1942 and occupied the Indies for three years. In line 
with its campaign of Asia for Asians, the Japanese forced the ethnic Chinese to 
send their children to Chinese schools. Parents duly withdrew their children 
from Dutch schools and enrolled them in Chinese schools. Among the teachers 
here were children and friends of the teachers and other intellectuals who had 
left China during the latter half of the previous century. After the departure 
of the Japanese, followed by the declaration of Indonesia’s independence 
on 17 August 1945, the arrangement continued. By that time, at school the 
children had been taught of their Chinese cultural heritage, where they were 
also largely buoyed by the fervour of the nationalism in China which saw the 
birth of People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. The pride of being 
Chinese infected many of the young minds then. A number of Chinese social 
organisations were founded.
After the Dutch finally ceded power in 1949, the issue of loyalty became 
increasingly merged with that of identity. It was during this time also that a 
bigger picture appeared. Firstly, not all ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were in 
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favour of the new communist China. Many were Kuomintang sympathisers. 
Secondly, a fair number of ethnic Chinese were largely unaffected by the 
Communist and Kuomintang conflict, preferring to focus on life in the new 
republic. Lastly, of those groups mentioned above, many sympathised with 
the nascent Indonesian nationalism.
In the new republic however, the insecurity of the ethnic Chinese was 
revived as regulation after regulation was enacted to suggest that they 
were less than welcome. Among them were the 1954 regulations barring 
them from purchasing rural property and owning rice-mills, and the 1955 
regulation barring them from studying at university. Stuart Pearson, writing 
the memoirs of his ethnic Chinese Indonesian mother-in-law, An Sudibyo, 
quotes and describes her feelings about the situation then, 
I believe the Indonesian Government wanted to rid itself completely of 
Chinese, so they structured the arrangement in such a way that everyone 
who had not accepted Indonesian citizenship by December 1951 was 
automatically regarded as an ‘alien’ and therefore liable for expulsion.. 
(Pearson 2008:125)
The ethnic Chinese were practically required to decide overnight, 
whether to accept Chinese citizenship or refuse it and officially become 
Indonesian citizens. Even those who took Indonesian citizenship were not 
spared discrimination problems. They were still treated as foreigners, a legacy 
of the Dutch colonial administration policy. One prominent example was 
businesses operated by citizens of ethnic Chinese were categorised as foreign 
companies and subjected to discriminatory legislation.
Ethnic Chinese During The New Order’s Government
Under the New Order government (1967 – 1998), ethnic Chinese continued 
to be disadvantaged. They were not only politically disempowered, but 
also presented in the worst possible light. Even a basic right like citizenship, 
was made problematic for them. Having officially taken up the citizenship, 
they still had to have a specific document, a certificate proving Indonesian 
citizenship, known as Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia or SBKRI, 
which invariably cost them a lot of money, the amount of which depending 
on the demand of each official who had to sign the application. On top of that, 
since their identity cards were specifically coded, each time an ethnic Chinese 
had to apply for any licence or document, he/she had to pay a higher fee than 
their indigenous counterparts. At the same time, few individuals who were 
publicly known as ‘close’ to the power elite, hence able to obtain preferential 
treatment in say, tendering for major projects, were given such high profiles 
that it was etched into public consciousness that the ethnic Chinese were 
inherently corrupt, so they became fair game for extortion. Unfortunately, 
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this practice became so ingrained and widespread that even the poorest of 
the ethnic Chinese expected to be subjected to various forms of extortion. As a 
result, many had no option but not to obtain the various documents, even the 
ones required by the government.
Throughout decades of being part of Indonesian nation, the ethnic 
Chinese have had to live with the awareness that violence, mostly to their 
property, occasionally to their person and it can descend upon them anytime. 
They have had to depend on the power elite, or in the very least, those in 
charge of national security, for protection. This unsurprisingly has placed 
them in very awkward and unbalanced alliances, of which they have had no 
choice. Since the end of New Order’s rule, the situation is slowly improving 
for the ethnic Chinese. They are since allowed cultural expression, such as 
publicly celebrating Chinese New Year and using Chinese characters in public 
space without fear of prosecution or persecution.
1. Self-perceptions
As for self-perceptions of ethnic Chinese in terms of their Indonesian identity, 
there does not appear to be a collective one2. There is instead, a wide continuum 
where on one hand, those who believe  a separate race, must retain their 
Chinese cultural heritage. Because the indigenous population do not want 
them in their community anyway. A large number of this category of ethnic 
Chinese live in West Kalimantan cities, notably Pontianak and Singkawang, 
and in Sumatra, especially Medan and Palembang. These are mainly places 
where ethnic Chinese communities appear to fully function with a minimum 
of interaction with the ethnic Malay majority  and other minority ethnic 
groups, such as ethnic Arab and ethnic Indian.  
On the other hand, those who have abandoned their Chinese attributes, 
belong to the land in which they live, especially if their families have interracial 
marriage with nonchinese. They even have adopted the local language as their 
own regional language along with Indonesian as their national language. A 
large number of this category live in  Java, especially metropolitan Jakarta 
including its outskirts, central and East Java,  in northeast Sulawesi notably 
in Manado. Scattered in between, they feel with differring degrees of ethnic 
Chinese sense of identity while they feel grounded in Indonesia and being 
Indonesian. They have assimilated the political uncertainties and insecurities 
into their day-to-day lives, as an inherent part of life itself. They can be found 
throughout Indonesia, even among those in West Kalimantan, north and 
south Sumatra.
 
2 This information was collated during the author’s three-year research in 
preparation of Breaking The Stereotype: Chinese Indonesian Women Tell Their Stories 
(2010), during which time time she travelled to different regions of Indonesia and 
spoke with many people, of Chinese and other ethnicity.
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Dewi Anggraeni (2010) in her book presents a sample of eight ethnic 
Chinese women who do not in anyway fit into the stereotypical images, 
generally attributed to them. One of them, Ester Indahyani Jusuf (2010:3-32), 
for example, could wipe the stereotype off the canvas with one brush stroke. 
She is a human rights activist, fighting not only for ethnic Chinese, but anyone 
of any ethnicity. She is married to an ethnic Javanese (her late first husband, 
Arnold (Ucok) Purba, was of Batak ethnicity). Having founded Solidaritas 
Nusa Bangsa, a non-profit nongovernmental organisation, with her then 
husband Arnold Purba and a number of friends, she now still regularly 
donates part of her income as a lawyer to the organisation. She does not show 
any inclination or desire to operate any business. Modifying the popular 
profile however, will be a massive and slow process, because what has been 
embedded in the collective psyche of the population will take a concerted 
effort on everybody’s part over a long time, to dislodge.
Australia: How many Chinese?
In the 2006 Australian Census, 669.890 Australian residents identified 
themselves as having Chinese ancestry, either alone or with another ancestry. 
Thus they made up just over 3 percent of the whole population of 21 million at 
the time. The first documented arrivals, originating in the southern provinces 
of China, took place in mid 19th century. They were among the human cargoes, 
as indentured labourers, destined for Cuba, Peru and the Caribbean sugar 
colonies as well as Australia.  Thus they fit into Wang’s coolie pattern. Those 
who arrived in Sydney, as described by Pan (1990:11) in her book, 
‘In October 1848, the Nimrod, a 234-ton barque, brought 120 Chinese 
labourers from Amoy to Sydney through the agency of James Tait. The 
odd Chinese carpenter and houseboy had preceded them many years 
before, but the arrivals on Nimrod were probably the first Chinese to come 
to New South Wales as a group. They were followed by many others, 
for Australian squatters badly needed pastoral labour in appreciable 
quantities (Pan 1990:11) 
Some of these people may have been skilled workers and artisans, but 
they were never perceived as anything but manual labourers, comparing to 
those who were shipped to Jayakarta to help build Coen’s Batavia. They were 
brought in as indentured labourers to work on farms belonging to private 
landowners, to look after cattle and sheep, and build, then work, the irrigation 
system.
Then in 1851, gold was discovered in Australia. This brought streams of 
immigrants from all around the world, the Chinese among them. Again most 
of them came from the southern region, especially the province of Quangdong 
(then known as Canton). More than 40.000 men and over 9.000 women were 
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documented to have migrated to the goldfields in 20 years. Incidents of 
violent conflict among different nationality groups seeking gold, frequently 
occurred. These led to Sir Charles Hotham, then Governor of Victoria, to 
appoint a Royal Commission to investigate Victorian goldfields problems and 
grievances. The Commission’s findings resulted in restrictions being placed 
on Chinese immigration and residency taxes levied from Chinese residents 
in Victoria from 1855. Six years later, in 1861, New South Wales imposed the 
same restrictions. The restrictions were in force until the early 1870s.
Coming to a Land with Harsh Political and Social Landscape: 
the Forming of a Stereotype
When the Chinese really began to come, Australia was a convict colony of 
Britain. On the whole, it was a very sparsely populated continent. Apart from 
the relatively small numbers of Aborigines, by 1800 there were fewer than 
6000 white people, and only one-tenth of these were free settlers. The arrivals 
in large numbers of an alien race would have been unsettling to their fragile 
sense of cohesiveness in the best of times.
Even after federation in 1901, Australian attitudes toward the Chinese 
were hostile at worst and extremely suspicious at best. Alison Broinowski 
(1992:6) describes the sentiments toward nonwhite in Australia at the time:
For more than a century most settler Australians defined Asia not as 
many diverse countries but as one and as a generalised source of threat. 
While they had inherited other enemies – Russians, Germans, French, 
even Americans – from their British identity, Asia seemed peculiarly their 
own (Broinowski 1992:6)
The first Bill introduced at Federal Parliament in 1901, was indeed the 
Immigration Restriction Act, a precursor of the White Australia Policy. This 
Act continued to be strengthened with subsequent Acts, making entry into 
Australia by Chinese extremely difficult. Alfred Deakin, Australia’s second 
prime minister, the chief architect of the the White Australia Policy, deemed 
the Policy necessary as he perceived the Chinese and Japanese to be a threat to 
the newly formed federation. As far as white Australians were concerned, the 
Chinese were only good as labourers who worked for them. They were not, 
however, to live among them, let alone as equals. White Australians found the 
Chinese unacceptable in all respects, whether these touched the unemotive or 
emotive sides of the white population.
 
Unemotive Side: Perceived Undesirable Qualities
Even in a relatively unemotive language, the Chinese were clearly perceived 
as possessing of undesirable qualities in terms of living among white 
Australians, qualities which in other circumstances would have been actively 
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sought. The suggestion was that with the Chinese around, white Australians 
would have very little chance of maintaining their high standard of living and 
having decent jobs at the same time.
The sense of threat felt by the Anglo-Australians at the time was more 
real than a mere excuse. Though strongly identifying British, the newly 
formed federation was very much driven by the idealism of an egalitarian 
and classless society. Emancipists and free settlers alike, were reluctant to 
accept any foreign groups which would disturb that ambition even in the 
remotest possibility. In fact, they did not even like the free settlers who gave 
the impression of wanting to reintroduce the classed society they had left 
behind in Britain. The Chinese, in this case, were believed to have come from 
an inherently hierarchical society and as such, were incompatible with the 
ideals of the  newly formed federation.
Emotive Side: Compounded Fear of the Threat of the ‘Unknown’ 
Leading to Confusion and Misconception
The general population’s inability to differentiate between Chinese and 
Japanese plays the emotive side of the need for excluding the Chinese from 
Australian soil. The fear of the Japanese during the beginning of 20th century 
was thus consolidated with the ‘alien’ attributes and qualities of the Chinese. 
Films showing images of the Asian (Japanese and Chinese) threat, helped the 
population absorb the message subliminally. Raymond Longford’s film (1913) 
Australia Calls suggested Asian invaders were Japanese, which they named 
Mongolians. It also showed attacks on local Chinese by settler and Aboriginal 
Australians. A film of the American fleet’s visit included  the footage to 
simulate a Japanese invasion. Phil Walsh’s film (1928), The Birth of White 
Australia, showed the massacre of Chinese at Lambing Flat, New South Wales, 
in 1860-61. In fact, the Lambing Flat violence was just one example of how the 
qualities that would later be referred to by Deakin as ‘good qualities’, worked 
against the Chinese themselves in the context of the gold rush society of that 
time. The white gold diggers – British and continental Europeans, tended to 
work alone or in small groups, and in random fashion, concentrating on rich 
patches of grounds then abandoning them to move on to other spots. Not 
many were able to earn a decent living that way, let alone striking rich. The 
Chinese on the other hand, tended to work in large organised groups. They 
took over a large surface at a time, thus sooner or later they would find gold. 
They worked long hours, slept in simple quarters and ate basic food, hence 
even with a smaller return of gold they had a lot more to show for their efforts 
than the other nationality groups.
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More Subtle Campaign Reaching to Both Levels: 
Cerebral and Emotional
A similarly relentless campaign was maintained on a more subtle and 
seemingly cerebral level. For example, in 1865, in an edition of the Melbourne 
Punch, an Australian literary magazine, Chevalier, a cartoonist, sketched 
newly-rich Chinese acting as though they owned the place. Broinowski 
(1992:9) writes,
A cartoon image of a Chinese posing as A.B. Paterson’s comic bushman, 
Mulga Bill, reflected the perennial fear that lazy Australians would have 
the tables turned on them, and that they would become the ‘poor white 
trash of Asia (Broinowski 1992:9)
Just as undesirable if not more, it appeared, was fraternising and worse, 
intermarrying, with the Chinese. Here ‘others’ means ‘nonwhites’.
‘In 1902 Hop managed in black and white to suggest the awful polychrome 
possibilities of intermarriage with Asian and others (Broinowski 1992:9)  
Another argument circulating then which on the face of it sounded 
rational, was that the Chinese came from a very different culture from that 
of egalitarian Australians. They were imbued, the argument said, with a 
hierarchical and authoritarian concept of humanity, completely incompatible 
with universally held in Australia. 
There was a kind of counterbalance to the above negative images lodged 
in public consciousness, generated by the proponents of orientalism. While 
the concepts held by most adherents of the White Australia Policy were 
generally dark and sinister, the orientalist’s take was mostly beautiful and 
idealistic, even of dreamlike quality. The orientalist concepts and their array 
of manifestations are still available today in the realm of the arts, such as 
paintings, sculptures, literature and drama.
Stereotype vis-à-vis Reality
Stereotypical concept and images of the Chinese have been largely based on 
four premises3:
1. They were a threat to the Australian way of life where egalitarianism 
and mateship were the mainstay, not hierarchy and authority 
2. They were a threat to workers in Australia because Australian workers 
would not be able to compete with them
3 This list was collated based on documented data as well as the author’s personal 
communication with Australians throughout four decades of living and working in 
Australia 
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3. Their main ambition was accumulating wealth, hence they would not 
hesitate to take over the country and its resources
4. Their culture was too different from that of white Australians, so the 
distance was too vast for the two sides to converge
When the above four elements were fleshed out, they could reach into 
spots and corners of the collective consciousness of Australians, manifested 
in numerous shapes and forms which kept adding to the popular profile of 
the ethnic Chinese in Australia. During the latter half of 19th century, the fear 
and suspicions generated by the stereotype hindered a great deal of natural 
social intercourse between the ethnic Chinese and the rest of the population. 
Even those who subscribed to the orientalist concepts were happier if Chinese 
culture were more of an idea than a reality that might confront them as they 
stepped out of the confines of their own homes.
White Australia Policy, as well as the taxes and levies imposed specifically 
upon the Chinese, may have stopped further large numbers coming to 
Australia, however those who were already in the country managed to find 
their own spots in society, with varying degrees of success.
Becoming Indispensable Part of Australian Society
In everyday life, the Chinese found vocations which were indispensable to all 
Australians, such as market-gardening, cabinet-making, printing, and fine arts 
as well as general cuisine. And those who eventually enjoyed financial success 
sent their children to a good school and universities, thus producing a new 
generation of ethnic Chinese with a more acceptable to the generally white 
population. With subsequent intermarriages with members of other ethnic 
groups in Australia, including Australian Aborigines, at least two generations 
of Chinese Australians, especially the mixed-race among them, have entered 
Australian society with relative ease. They are actively participating in various 
professions and vocations: in different levels of government, in the legal 
and medical professions, in commerce, in education, in the arts and in the 
trades. One of Australia’s current senior ministers is Penny Wong, a Chinese 
Australian born of a white mother.
John Fitzgerald (2007) confronts the stereotype about this group and 
finds that the Chinese themselves have gone a long way in breaking it 
down with their own lives and contributions to the nation. Among the list 
of achievements Fitzgerald names clubs and businesses, founded by Chinese 
Australians,
‘Chinese Australian merchants were among the earliest in the diaspora 
to recognise the value of inclusive clubs and societies for community 
management and business networking. The NSW Chinese Chamber 
of Commerce (1903) was founded some years after the Hong Kong 
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Chamber (1896) but ahead of comparable chambers in Singapore and 
Straits settlements, the Dutch East Indies, North America and even China 
itself…(Fitzgerald 2007:181)
With White Australia Policy officially dismantled in 1973, new streams 
of Chinese immigrants, many come from countries other than China (e.g. 
Malaysia and Hong Kong prior to 1997 handover), fitting Wang (1994)’s descent 
and remigrant pattern, began to be admitted into the country. In 1990s, after 
Tiananmen Square, many young individuals, students and intellectuals, were 
further accepted They were seen as victims of an authoritarian regime, whose 
lives would be in serious threat if they did not leave China. More importantly, 
the Prime Minister of Australia, Bob Hawke, took exceptional interest in them 
and promised them refuge in Australia. 
By now, Australia has been exposed to different outlooks on life, differing 
lifestyles, various types of mannerism and body language from the ethnic 
Chinese. Some of course still recognisably foreign to most of the population, 
especially in the cases of those who had been in the country for a short time, 
and still tend to move within their own circles, their comfort zones.
Self-Perceptions
While the mainstream society in Australia still have problems telling the 
differences between Asian ethnicities, such as Chinese, Korean, Japanese, 
Malay and Indonesian, let alone differentiating different subethnics of China. 
They can tell the class differences among the ethnic Chinese and they think 
they are ethnic Chinese.  Class differences are indeed a prominent aspect of 
Chinese Australians’ self-perceptions. 4 A second, third or fourth generation 
Chinese Australian doctor or dentist, for instance, would regard himself/
herself as an Australian doctor or dentist rather than Chinese doctor or 
dentist. It is also generally the case with Chinese Australian teachers, writers, 
artists and drycleaners. At a more subliminal level however, most Chinese 
Australians have never severed their emotional ties with their homeland in 
China. When they are asked by his/her family dialect for instance, an ethnic 
Chinese Australian would more likely to say ‘Hakka’, ‘Hokkien’ or Teochew’ 
than ‘Victorian’ or ‘South Australian’. This is also mostly the case with those 
who migrated to Australia from Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.
There are two main elements which can explain this social phenomenon. 
First, Australia is being an immigrant receiving country, barring its various 
aboriginal tribes. All the rest of the population come from other places and 
coming from another country is a given, not an indication of being foreign or 
disloyal. Second, apart from the dominant British culture, which varies in
4 Information gathered by the author during four decades of living in Australia            
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strength from state to state, there are not any particular local ‘home cultures’ 
into which the ethnic Chinese feel comfortable to blend, their physical features 
alone setting them apart. Thus, their subconscious longing for belonging can 
only be fulfilled by staying with the original ancestral culture, however distant 
in time it may be. Residuals of the stereotype remain, though they no longer 
form a strong barrier, though a more subtle barrier still exists, between the 
ethnic Chinese and the rest of the population.
Different Situations: Indonesia and Australia
The Chinese who arrived in Indonesia and Australia, both have had to 
struggle to be accepted, when they have wanted to live and settle in the 
respective countries. For that reason, they have had to break the mould of the 
widespread stereotype. The Chinese who left China in 15th century onwards 
or in earlier times, were necessarily of the adventurous and outward-looking 
type, who did not recoil from the idea of serious risk-taking. Depending on 
the local cultures at the places of their destination, they were either accepted, 
even welcomed as proponents of progress, or shunned as agents provocateurs 
who tended to upset the established set-ups which the majority of locals 
perceived as ideal. They were also suspected of ambitions to rob the locals of 
their natural resources and other riches. Those who left China during the rule 
of Ming Dynasty, sailed out with a desire to visit China’s tributary regions 
in the southern seas. Most of them came to what is now known as Southeast 
Asia. 
In various parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago, those early small 
entrepreneurs and artisans were able to fit in slots which they created 
themselves but worked well with the general communities. They may have 
had problems adjusting to the local mores, but their industriousness, specific 
skills and expertise may have put them in fairly good steads.
Serious problems arose during the times of Dutch occupation. The Dutch 
recognised the entrepreneurial skills of the Chinese and used them to their 
own advantage. By placing the Chinese between themselves and the natives, 
the Chinese became a kind of bumper which took the hard knocks coming 
from both sides. It also created a social cleavage between the Chinese and the 
natives, generating a great deal of resentment on the part of the natives, and 
an illusion of power on the part of the Chinese, which made them even less 
liked. Nonetheless they were predisposed to taking the side of independence 
fighters against Dutch colonialism. This placed them on the wrong side of the 
Dutch rulers.
Those who came in 18th century were driven by poverty, which would 
have rendered them more easily accepted by the natives if not for the fact 
that the Dutch separated them from the rest of the population. This added 
impetus to negative stereotyping. History and political events have not been 
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very kind to the Chinese who have wanted to live in the Indies and later on, in 
the nation of Indonesia. Not having a natural, geographical area of their own, 
the Chinese have always been disadvantaged politically. Hence, they needed 
the acceptance of those who had political power.
One of the huge differences between the situations in Indonesia and in 
Australia lies in the fact that in Indonesia the locals had contact with Chinese 
people other than those brought by the Dutch colonial administration as 
manual labourers. There had been trading activities between the locals and 
Chinese seafarers, especially from the Ming dynasty era. Some of whom, 
from time to time, decided to stay and settle in various areas of what is now 
Indonesia. 
On the other hand Australia, when the Chinese began arriving in earnest 
in 19th century, was a convict colony of Britain. On the whole it was very 
sparsely populated. Apart from the relatively small numbers of Aborigines, 
by 1800 there were fewer than 6000 white people, and only one-tenth of those 
were free settlers. The colonial authorities only took in the Chinese under 
duress, for want of other options. Neither the white settlers nor the emancipists, 
had any interaction with the Chinese except as master and labourer.
Despite the rough beginnings, in Australia, the journey of the ethnic 
Chinese toward social integration has been a lot more linear  than it has been 
in Indonesia. Their struggle of acceptance has progressed ahead with very few 
setbacks. They have always had freedom of cultural expression even under 
White Australia Policy, and the mainstream society have always expected 
them to maintain links with their cultural homeland. At the same time, they 
have equal legal standing as the rest of the population, as their citizenship is 
as good and as solid as anyone else.
In Indonesia, people have been conditioned to expect their ethnic Chinese 
citizens, at 3 percent of 240 million, over 7 million, to show loyalty by severing 
cultural links with China, though this is gradually changing. They are still 
regarded with a degree of suspicion and as ready targets for resentment. The 
legal framework meant to protect their rights. It is not always enforced or 
enforceable. The struggle to be accepted in Indonesia, therefore, has been more 
arduous and fraught with continuing insecurity, for the ethnic Chinese. l
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